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THE TOSHIBA-KONGSBERG INCIDENT:
SHORTCOMINGS OF COCOM, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCREASED
EFFECTIVENESS OF EXPORT CONTROLS TO THE
EAST BLOC
Wende A. Wrubel*
Capitalists are so shortsighted in the pursuit of profits that the), will sell us the
rope with which to hang themselves.
Vladimir I. Lenin
INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Union has in place a massive and successful program to
acquire, and use for military purposes, advanced Western technology
that the free world regards as vital to its security.1 To acquire Western
* J.D. Candidate, 1989, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See Thomas, Moles Who Burrow for Microchips, TIME, June 17, 1985, at 25
(discussing the manner in which the Soviet Union acquires Western technology
through legal and illegal channels); Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant West-
ern Technology: An Update, Sept. 1985, reprinted in Export Controls Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Bank-
ing. Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 235 (1987) [hereinafter Soviet
Acquisition of Technology] (statement of Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security) (confirming the significance of the 1985 United
States government report that described the well-organized Soviet program for ob-
taining sophisticated sensitive technology); UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY REPORT: SoviET ACQUISITION OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY, Hearings Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982) [hereinafter CIA REPORT] (discussing the difficulty of
curtailing the Soviet Union's extensive acquisition of militarily-related Western tech-
nology); Pipes, How To Cope With the Soviet Threat, COMMENTARY, Aug. 1984, at 27
(discussing the technology the Soviet Union acquired from the West during the past
twenty-five years); accord Dudney, How Soviets Steal U.S. High-Tech Secrets, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 12, 1985, at 33 (discussing the degree to which the
Soviets rely on stolen United States industrial secrets to rescue their country from eco-
nomic stagnation); Control of Technology Transfers to the Soviet Union Before the
Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigation of the Comm. on Government Affairs,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1982) (statement of Sen. Nunn) (outlining the basic ap-
proaches that the Soviet Union uses to acquire necessary high-technology); Perle, The
Soviet Connection I, DEF., Feb. 1982, at 10 (arguing that the Soviet Union has taken
advantage of loose export controls in the West to acquire vital goods and equipment);
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE USSR
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY [hereinafter INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION](discussing how the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry creates and uses op-
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technology, the Soviet Union devotes vast amounts of financial re-
sources and manpower.' By saving hundreds of millions of dollars in
research and development costs as well as decades in the development
of new technology,3 the Soviet Union narrows the Western lead daily in
virtually all key technological areas.4
The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies obtain vast amounts of
militarily significant Western technology through both legal and illegal
means. 5 Soviet intelligence services play the primary role in gathering
Western military technology.6 In recent years, the Soviet Union has
portunities for legally acquiring information of value to Soviet industry while mislead-
ing Westerners about their activities).
2. See CIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining that the Soviet effort to obtain
Western technology is massive, well-planned, and well-managed at the national level
with approval at the highest party and governmental levels).
3. Dudney, supra note 1, at 33. The Soviet Union saves millions of dollars and
years of military research by using stolen technology that the West relies on to offset
the high Soviet numerical advantage in weapon systems. Id. See Soviet Acquisition of
Technology, supra note 1, at I (estimating that in the 1980s, as many as 5,000 Soviet
military research projects benefitted from such stolen technology); CIA REPORT, supra
note 1, at 10 (stating that the Soviet Union modernizes critical sectors of their military
industry at a much faster rate than the West because it copies proven Western de-
signs). This rapid modernization enables the Soviet Union to achieve greater perform-
ance from their weapons than if relying solely on its own technology. Id. This allows
the Soviet Union to begin to incorporate countermeasures against Western weapons
while developing their own weapon programs. Id. When it assimilates Western technol-
ogy into its weapons systems, the Soviet Union improves its position in the arms race,
thereby forcing American taxpayers to pay more in defense costs to counter the Soviet
threat. Id.
4. See Soviet Acquisition of Technology, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that in the
materials, explosive, and sensor technologies found in tanks, artillery, and antitank and
surface-to-air missiles, the technology level of Soviet weapons systems equals or slightly
surpasses that of the United States). The Soviet Union leads the West in fields such as
chemical warfare and laser research. Id.; see also Thomas, supra note 1, at 25 (stating
that since the late 1970s, the Soviet Union gained 30,000 pieces of high-tech equip-
ment and 40,000 technical documents through illicit channels).
5. See CIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing the various legal and illegal
methods of Soviet acquisition of goods and technology from the West). The Soviet
Union legally acquires Western technology through open literature, legal trade chan-
nels, and scientific and technological exchanges and conferences. Id. The Soviet Union
illegally acquires technology through trade channels that evade Western export controls
primarily through two means that are difficult to detect and monitor. Id. at 3. First, the
Soviets may divert controlled technology from legitimate trade channels to prescribed
destinations through dummy Western corporations; through United States and foreign
firms willing to engage in "profitable impropriety;" through their own agents in place
in foreign firms; and through foreign purchasing agents. Id. Secondly, the Soviet Union
may divert legally acquired technology to unauthorized military ends. Id. These chan-
nels are designed to evade export controls set by the Coordinating Committee for Mul-
tilateral Controls (Cocom). Id. at 2.
6. See id. at 1 (stating that the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) and
the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff (GRU) together retain
responsibility for coordinating the illegal acquisition of Western technology); see also
Dudney, supra note 1, at 33 (stating that the success of the Soviet Union in gaining
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become less interested in stealing the finished product than in acquiring
the know-how used to build it.7 As a result, many Soviet weapons and
high technology equipment are almost exact duplicates of Western
weapons and equipment."
In 1981, the Toshiba Machine Company and Kongsberg
Vaapenfabrik began selling advanced milling machinery and accompa-
nying numerical control equipment to the Soviet Union in violation of
the regulations of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (Cocom).9 Cocom functions to prohibit the export of sophisti-
access to advanced Western technology is due to the fact that the Soviet Union em-
ploys approximately 2,000 intelligence agents, smugglers, and international middlemen
stationed around the globe); INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, supra note 1, at I (describing
that the Soviet effort to acquire militarily significant Western technology consists of
two programs). The first program is managed by the Military Industrial Commission of
the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. Id. Its function is to gather one-of-
a-kind military and dual-use hardware and blueprints to improve the technical levels of
Soviet weaponry and military equipment. Id. The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Soviet
intelligence services administers the second program by diverting dual-use manufactur-
ing and test equipment into the production lines of weapons industries. Id; see gener-
ally Soviet Acquisition of Technology, supra note 1, at 2-16 (discussing in greater
detail the two programs the Soviet Union uses to acquire Western hardware and
documents).
7. See T. GUSTAFSON, SELLING THE RUSSIANS THE ROPE? SoviET TECHNOLOGY
POLICY AND U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS, reprinted in American Technology Transfer and
Soviet Energy Planning: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Over-
sight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 55(1981-1982) (stating that the Soviet Union fails to exploit the potential advantages of
combining high technology Western imports with their own domestic structure). The
author argues that the Soviet Union, in its present capacity, is incapable of profiting
from the import of finished end-products. Id.; accord OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, An Analysis
of Export Control of U.S. Technology - A DOD Perspective (Report of the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Export of U.S. Technology) [hereinafter Bucy Report]
(examining a number of critical technologies, their impact on United States strategic
requirements, the mechanisms through which information about them is transferred,
and the current effectiveness of export controls and the Cocom agreement). The Bucy
Report recommended that three categories of United States exports should receive pri-
mary emphasis in control efforts, since they are the most effective in the transfer of
vital design and manufacturing know-how. Id. at 3. The three categories are 1) infor-
mation that includes intricate instructions on how to design and manufacture an item;
2) "keystone" manufacturing, inspection or automatic test equipment; and 3) products
that come equipped with sophisticated information on operation or application. Id. at 3.
8. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 25 (stating that the Soviet Airborne Warning and
Control System and space shuttles replicate earlier United States models). For exam-
ple, the Soviet Union introduced a system identical to the Boeing short takeoff and
landing prototype just months after this model appeared in the United States; the SU-
15 fighter that shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007 did so with a missile guidance
system that was engineered in the West; the Soviet mainframe RIAD computer is
IBM's 360 and 370 series, while the Soviet AGAT personal computer is a copy of the
Apple II. Id.
9. See infra notes 10-14 and accompanying text (discussing the role Cecom plays
in the control of sensitive technology among the Western nations).
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cated high technology machinery to Communist bloc countries. The il-
legal shipments of state-of-the-art equipment to the Soviet Union by
Toshiba and Kongsberg served to seriously undermine Western na-
tional and international security. This incident sharply illustrates the
inherent weaknesses in the effectiveness of multilateral export controls
coordinated by Cocom.
Part I of this Comment describes the multilateral agreement estab-
lished by the United States and its Western allies to control the trans-
fer of sensitive goods and technology to the Soviet Union. Part II ex-
amines Toshiba and Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik's illegal sale of sensitive
Western technology to the Soviet Union. Part III explores the Japanese
and Norwegian governmental responses to the incident, and Part IV
provides three different analyses of the Toshiba-Kongsberg incident
and suggests possible remedies for increasing the effectiveness of the
multilateral export control system.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COCOM
The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(Cocom) 10 was organized at the advent of the Cold War" to restrict
the flow of strategic technology to the Soviet Union and other Commu-
nist nations. 2 In the post war period, the United States and its allies
10. See Comment, Cocom: Limitations on the Effectiveness of Multilateral Export
Controls, 2 Wis. INT'L L.J. 106, 107 n.2 (1983) [hereinafter Cocom Limitations] (stat-
ing that Cocom is sometimes referred to as the International Export Control Coordi-
nating Committee and as the Coordinating Committee).
11. See Recent Development, Trade Regulation - Export Controls - Cocom Agrees
on New Multilateral Export Guidelines Allowing Eastern Bloc to Purchase Low Level
Technology Legally, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 197, 197 n.4 (1986) [hereinafter
Cocom Agrees on Guidelines] (stating that Cocom was initiated in 1949 in response to
the Cold War following the close of World War II); Hunt, Multilateral Cooperation
In Export Controls - The Role of Cocom, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1285, 1286 (1983)
(maintaining that the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union led to
the formation of Cocom); Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls Past,
Present and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 834-42 (1967) (discussing the need for
controls among the West to deal with the perceived security threat posed by the Soviet
bloc); Bertsch, U.S. Export Controls: The 1970s and Beyond, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L.
67, 68 (1981) (promoting the ideological and strategic threat of the Soviet Union as a
military superpower after World War II).
12. See P. Hanson, Soviet Assimilation of Western Technology, in TRADE TECH-
NOLOGY AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS 63 (Parrot ed. 1985) (defining technology
as useful knowledge pertaining to the art of production); PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF
NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, COM-
MITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND PUBLIC POLICY: BALANCING THE NATIONAL
INTEREST - U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY EXPORT CONTROLS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC
COMPETITION, 87 (1987) [hereinafter BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST] (defining
"technical data" as "information of any kind that can be used, or adopted for use, in
the design, production, manufacture, utilization, or reconstruction of articles or materi-
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agreed on the need to control the transfer of militarily strategic tech-
nology to protect national security. 3 On January 1, 1950, in Paris,
France, Cocom began to coordinate the national controls that the West
placed on the export of strategic goods and technology to the Commu-
nist world.'- To bolster the control policies of Cocom, Congress estab-
lished sanctions in the form of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control
Act of 1951 (The Battle Act).15 This act was an attempt to unite the
United States with its allies in an effort to control the export of strate-
gic materials to Eastern bloc nations.1"
A. COCOM PROCEDURES AND REGULATIONS
1. Internal Operations of Cocom
The details of Cocom's operations and procedures are secret. 17 Se-
crecy is necessary to prevent Soviet acquisition of sensitive national se-
curity information and to insulate the member governments from do-
mestic political opposition." Cocom does not rest on any treaty or
formal agreement that is binding on its members.19 Rather, it is a
"gentlemen's agreement" 20 among nations because it serves as an infor-
als"); CIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 (including in its definition of "technology" the
application of scientific knowledge, technical information, know-how, critical materials,
keystone manufacturing and test equipment, and end-products vital to the research and
development of high-quality weapons and military equipment).
13. Hunt, supra note 11, at 1286; Cocom Agrees on Guidelines, supra note 11, at
197. In response to the recognized need to establish multilateral export control stan-
dards, the United States and its allies initially created a Consultative Group. Id. at 197
nA. Cocom, the organization that is in operation today, later replaced this group. Id.
The Consultative Group initially consisted of export officials from the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the United States. Id. See
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL RE-
PORT FY 1984 19 (stating that current Cocom membership includes Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States).
14. Buchan, Western Security and Economic Strategy Towards the East. 23 THE
ADELPHI PAPERS No. 192 (1984) [hereinafter Western Security].
15. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1611-13 (1951) super-
seded by the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1982).
The Battle Act denied financial aid from the United States to any nation that allowed
the export of strategic material to embargoed communist nations. Id.
16. Bingham & Johnson, A Rational Approach to Export Controls, 57 FOREIGN
AFF. 894, 903 (1979).
17. See id. at 903-04 (maintaining that secrecy also applies to the criteria em-
ployed by Cocom for including items on its embargo list).
18. Id.
19. Western Security, supra note 14, at 23.
20. HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER & SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 386 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW MATERIALS]. A "gen-
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mal, voluntary arrangement between the United States and its allies.21
The Committee must achieve unanimity before reaching any multilat-
eral agreement curtailing exports.22 All members of Cocom retain the
right to act independently in accordance with their own domestic legal,
administrative, and policy constraints.23 Individual members are thus
free to deviate from Cocom-approved export standards.24
2. Functions of Cocom
The main tasks of the permanent Cocom representatives are the de-
velopment of embargo lists, the enforcement of export restrictions, and
the approval or denial of certain exceptional sales.2 5 Embargoed items
are described on three lists: the International Atomic Energy List, the
International Munitions List, and the International List.26 Cocom does
tlemen's agreement" is formed when states intend to create only political or moral, as
opposed to legal, commitments to each other. Id. In such cases, the parties to the
agreement assume a voluntary commitment to perform certain acts or refrain from
them. Id. This type of commitment is termed nonlegal and thus not formally binding.
Id. The parties, however, share the expectation that there will be general reliance upon
the terms in the agreement. Id. An example of a gentlemen's agreement is the under-
standing that was undertaken in 1908 between the United States and Japan, concern-
ing immigration matters, which was observed for nearly two decades. Id.
21. Note, Accountability and the Foreign Commerce Power: A Case Study of the
Regulation of Exports, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 577, 582 (1979).
22. Aeppel, The Evolution of Multilateral Export Controls: A Critical Study of
the Cocom Regime, 9 FLETCHER F. 105, 109 (1985). See Perle, Making Sure Our
Technology Stays Ours, Wall St. J., July 22, 1987, at 16 [hereinafter Keeping Our
Technology] (discussing the lack of staff or resources in Cocom and its resulting inabil-
ity to manage effectively international transfers). Cocom has a permanent secretariat
of about a dozen people, and operates on an annual budget of roughly $500,000,
funded pro rata by the members. Id. Prior to 1976, Cocom had no computer system, no
simultaneous translation facilities, no professional staff, no research or intelligence ca-
pability, and no military advisers. Id. To further illustrate the constraints under which
Cocom must operate it "duplicated its reports on what must have been one of the last
hand-cranked mimeograph machines in Western Europe." Id. The first high level meet-
ing of Cocom since its founding took place in 1982 in response to a United States
request. Id.
23. Cocom Limitations, supra note 10, at 119 (stating that member governments
have no legal obligation to participate in Cocom activities or to abide by its commit-
ments, recommendations, or decisions).
24. Kempe & Lachica, Cocom Feuds Over Trade to East Bloc, Wall St. J., July
17, 1984, at 35.
25. Export Licensing: Cocom List Review Proposals of the United States: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House
Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1978) [hereinafter
Cocom List Review] (statement of William Barraclough, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for
International Trade Policy, Dept. of State); Aeppel, supra note 22, at 108; Control of
Technology Transfers to the Soviet Union: Hearings Before the Senate Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigation of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 42 (1982) (testimony of the Hon. James L. Buckley).
26. BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 12, at 97. The international
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not publish its embargo lists, but the content of the lists are often re-
flected in the national lists of export controls maintained by member
countries. 27
3. United States Involvement in Cocom
Since 1949, the United States government has controlled the export
of militarily significant commercial products2" throughout the world. 29
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA)30 codifies export guide-
lines in the United States. Under the EAA, the United States Depart-
ment of Commerce exercises control over most articles, supplies, and
unpublished technical data from the United States, its territories, and
or dual-use list includes three types of goods:
1. items specially designed or used primarily for development, production, or util-
ization of arms, ammunition, or military systems;
2. items incorporating unique technological know-how, the acquisition of which
might give significant direct assistance to the development and production of
arms, ammunition or military systems; and
3. items in which proscribed nations have a deficiency they are not likely to over-
come that hinders development and production of arms, ammunition, or military
systems.
Id.; See also U.S. Tries to Cut Trade in Items that Russians Might Use for Military.
Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1982, at 1 (stating that items that are made primarily for civilian
use, such as the concrete tester often have important, although hidden, military uses);
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DETAILS OF CERTAIN CONTRO-
VERSIAL EXPORT LICENSING DECISION INVOLVING SOvIET-BLOC COUNTRIES (1983) 1
(stating that dual-use goods are industrial goods of probable military application).
27. See Hunt, supra note 11, at 1289 (explaining that much of the content of
Cocom policy is inferred from Cocom's control lists which generally are a reflection of
the member nation's export guidelines).
28. BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 12, at 129. In determining
whether a commercial item could be classified for dual-use the Department of Defense
uses the following criteria:
1. Is the item appropriate for the stated civil end?
2. Is there any evidence that the stated end-user is engaged in military or mili-
tary support activities to which this item could be applied?
3. How difficult would it be to divert this item to military purposes?
4. Could such diversion be carried out without detection?
Id.; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1986)
[hereinafter 1986 EAA REPORT].
29. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE: EXPORT LICENSING-COMMERCE-DEFENSE
REVIEW OF APPLICATIONS TO CERTAIN FREE WORLD NATIONS 8 (1986) [hereinafter
EXPORT LICENSING].
30. See Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503
(1979) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 et seq. (1982)) (stating that it is
United States policy to use export controls only after full consideration of the impact
on the economy of the United States); see also Weyhrauch, Operation Exodus: The
United States Government's Program to Intercept Illegal Exports of High Technol-
ogy, 7 COMPUTER L.J. 203, 209 (1986) (describing the Export Administration Act of
1979 as controlling exports from the United States and the control of reexports out of
foreign countries of products or data that originated in the United States).
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possessions. 31 The United States controls specific commodity exports
primarily for national security, 2 foreign policy, 33 and short supply rea-
sons.3 4 The Office of Export Administration of the Department of Com-
merce is the principal operating unit for administering and enforcing
export controls.35
The United States also maintains its own list of controlled items.30
This list is called the Commodity Control List (CCL).3 7 In addition to
the CCL, the Department of Defense has established its own 800-page
document that lists those items of potential military significance to the
31. EXPORT LICENSING, supra note 29, at 9. Section 10(g) of the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1979 also permits the Secretary of Defense to review some export license
applications if the proposed goods are destined for countries to which exports are con-
trolled for national security purposes. Export Administration Act of 1979, § 10(g), 50
U.S.C. app. § 2409(g) (1982).
32. Export Administration Act of 1979, § 5, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (1982). The
Act provides that the United States may use export controls "to restrict the export of
goods and technology which would make a significant contribution to the military po-
tential of any other country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental
to the national security of the United States. Id. § 3(2)(A), 50 U.S.C. app. 2402(2)(A)(1982). Exports are controlled for national security purposes to the following countries:
Romania, Hungary, Poland, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, German
Democratic Republic [including East Berlin], Cuba, Kampuchea, North Korea, Viet-
nam, The People's Republic of China, Laos, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolian People's
Republic and U.S.S.R. Id.
33. Id. § 6, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (1982). The Act provides that the United States
may use export controls "to restrict the export of goods and technology where neces-
sary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its de-
clared international obligations." Id. § 3(2)(B), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(B) (1982).
34. Id. § 7, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406 (1982). The Act provides that the United States
may use export controls "to restrict the export of goods where necessary to protect the
domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the seri-
ous inflationary impact of foreign demand." Id. § 3(2)(C), 50 U.S.C. app. §
2402(2)(C) (1982).
35. Id. § 12(a), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411(a) (1982).
36. See Commodity Control Lists and Related Matters, 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1988)(listing those goods that the United States unilaterally controls for export to Soviet bloc
countries).
37. Id. at § 399.1(0(2). The Commodity Control List (CCL) provides for both
multilaterally and unilaterally controlled items. Id. Currently, the CCL list carries 214
numbered categories of controlled items, out of which only 124 coincide with the
Cocom list. Id. See H.R. Rep. No. 257, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 10-12 (1983) (com-
paring the Commodity Control List, the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL),
and the Cocom List). The Department of Commerce developed the CCL to control
exports. Id. This list is available to the public as a guide for potential exporters. Id. The
MCTL is classified mainly because it explains why various items are considered criti-
cal. Id. The Department of Defense developed and maintains the MCTL. Id. The
Cocom list was developed through a largely informal process and is used as a guide to
control exports by Cocom countries. Id. While the Cocom list is not publicly available,
the CCL contains a great number of the items on the Cocom list. Id. The United
States uses the MCTL to persuade its allies that the West must control certain strate-
gic items. Id. at 12. The MCTL contains items that are not found on either the Cocom
list or the CCL. Id.
[VOL. 4:241
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Soviet Union.38 This list is called the Militarily Critical Technologies
List (MCTL).39 In recent years, the Reagan administration also
launched Operation Exodus,4° an extensive effort aimed at controlling
the export of sensitive technology.
While the United States has traditionally favored broadening the
scope of control over strategically sensitive items, Western Europe and
Japan disagree on the extent to which such restrictive control is neces-
sary and practical. 41 Disagreement centers around which technology is
of military significance. During the formal list review process, sharp
disagreements among Cocom members over the establishment of tech-
nical cutoff levels for controlled items manifests different conceptions of
Cocom operations and philosophy.42
38. Weyhrauch, supra note 30, at 209.
39. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 3231,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-12 (report submitted by Mr. Price, Committee on Armed Ser-
vices) (describing the MCTL and its relationship with the CCL); Weyhrauch, supra
note 30, at 209. The MCTL covers a broad spectrum of technologies, not all militarily
significant, that include computers, telecommunications, laser technology, and nuclear
equipment. Id. at 210.
40. See Weyhrauch, supra note 30, at 210-11 (stating that the United States Cus-
toms Service began Operation Exodus in response to the Reagan administration's effort
to stem the illegal export of United States technology to the Soviet Union). Operation
Exodus accomplishes its main objectives through the seizure of critical technology ille-
gally exported and the disruption of groups and individuals responsible for these illegal
exports. Id. Under Operation Exodus, customs agents, inspectors, patrol officers, and
other Customs personnel concentrate on stemming the illegal outflow of critical tech-
nology through United States ports of exit. Id. Exodus agents spot shipments that re-
quire further investigation and then refer them to the proper authorities for inspection.
Id. By targeting high-risk commodities and those companies who export them, Exodus
investigators can focus on discovering criminal conspiracies. Id. at 212.
41. See Buchan, Technology Transfer to the Soviet Bloc, 7 WASHINGTON Q. 131
(1984) [hereinafter Technology Transfer] (describing the historical division between
the United States and its allies in trying to harmonize export embargoes). The Western
allies and Japan maintain that the imposition of greater export controls will seriously
affect their economies. Id. at 133. For example, in 1982, Western Europe exported
69.1 % of its goods to the Soviet Union. Id. On the whole, East-West trade accounts for
only 1.7% of United States exports and 0.4% of United States imports, while this
same trade made up 2-6% of the total trade figures of the larger European countries
and anywhere from 10-25% for certain neutral countries. Id. Additionally, Western
Europe and Japan find it difficult to agree on the need for tightening up export controls
due in part to the inability of the Department of Defense to determine the overall
monetary cost to the West of illegal technology diversion to the Soviet Union. Id. at
132.
42. Sternheimer, East-West Technology Transfer: Japan and the Communist Bloc
76 THE WASH. PAPERS 12, 14 (1980). Since 1967 the United States has required ex-
port licenses for 625 categories of goods, yet 70% of these goods were not on the
Cocom list. Id.; see also Cocom Limitations, supra note 10, at 131 (describing the
attitude of some authorities that it is impossible to obtain general agreement in Cocom
on which nonmilitary technologies the Committee needs to control).
1989]
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4. Types of Export Licenses in the United States
In the United States, the majority of goods and technical data are
exported under general licenses, such as "General Destination" li-
censes.43 United States exporters must obtain a Validated License if
technical data or high technology items do not qualify for a General
License." Recently, the United States has increased the number of
general licenses for those commodities destined for export to the Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe, and the People's Republic of China."'
To export an item to the Soviet Union that appears on the Cocom
list, an exporter must submit an "exception request. 46 If the United
States knows or has reason to believe that a listed commodity is not
destined for military use and that the Soviet Union will not divert the
commodity to the military sector, the United States may relax the em-
bargo restrictions.47 If a member government allows the sale, it must
first obtain an exception to the embargo from Cocom.48
43. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A BASIC GUIDE To EXPORTING 51 (1986)
[hereinafter GUIDE TO EXPORTING] (stating that a General License constitutes a broad
grant of authority by the government to all exporters for certain classifications of com-
modities); Weyhrauch, supra note 30, at 209 (stating that exports that only require a
general license do not require individual applications or any specific licensing
document).
44. See GUIDE TO EXPORTING, supra note 43, at 51 (stating that a Validated Li-
cense gives a particular exporter a specific grant of authority to export a particular
product). A Validated License is granted on a case-by-case basis for either a particular
transaction or for a certain length of time. Id.
45. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA 21 (1983) (stat-
ing that in June of 1983, the Commerce Department changed the status of China from
Country Group P to Country Group V). The new regulations offer more liberal treat-
ment for such products as computers, microcircuits, and electronic manufacturing and
testing equipment exported to China. Id. See also Letterman, United States Regula-
tion of High-Technology Exports, 20 INT'L LAW. 1147, 1161 (1986) (listing the seven
country group classifications, designated by the letters Q, S, T, V, W, Y, and Z, by
which foreign countries are separated for export control purposes). Communist coun-
tries are usually contained in Country Groups Q, W and Y. id. Country Group V is a
"catchall" group containing most of the other noncommunist countries, plus a few
"Marxist" states, including The People's Republic of China. Id.
46. Hunt, supra note 11, at 1285-86. Under Cocom rules, a decision on an excep-
tion request must be made eighteen days after it is submitted with a two week
rescheduling period if no decision is reached. Id. An exception request, in order to be
approved, must receive unanimous agreement by the member countries. Id.
47. See Letterman, supra note 45, at 1178 (arguing that restricting the export of
United States goods and technical data that is readily available to controlled countries
from non-United States sources places the United States exporters in a poor competi-
tive position). For this reason, there is a "foreign availability" exception to United
States high-tech export controls. Id. Any export license applicant may reserve the right
to claim the foreign availability exception. Id.
48. BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 12 at 142-43 (explaining that
if a Cocom member State wishes to export a restricted good, it must obtain an excep-
tion by the unanimous consent of the other Members).
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Exception requests are reviewed with regard to the sensitivity of the
item concerned.4 9 Cocom members must unanimously approve the re-
quest before an exception is granted.5 In some circumstances, an ex-
porter in another country must obtain specific approval from the De-
partment of Commerce before reexporting products and technical data
with United States origin to another foreign country." The United
States is the only Cocom member that imposes reexport controls. 2 One
problem with the United States reexport control system stems from the
extraterritorial application of United States standards to United States
subsidiaries, goods, and data. These reexport controls often create sus-
picion between the United States and its allies.53 This is because some
members of Cocom view the United States practice of reexport controls
as an infringement on their sovereignty."
49. Western Security, supra note 14, at 25. The less sensitive goods that comprise
approximately half of the goods on the industrial dual-use list are considered national
discretion items. Id. Cocom allows national governments to decide themselves whether
to allow the sale of these goods. Id. Generally when a country proposes to sell a certain
quantity or value of listed goods, the government must contact Cocom for approval. Id.
Those goods in the latter half of the sensitivity list do not require Cocom permission for
export licensing. Id. Exception requests are required for the sale of goods to embargoed
destinations. Id.
50. Id.
51. 15 C.F.R. § 374 (1988). Reexport controls may include finished end-products
and, in some instances, parts and components originating in the United States. Id. The
foreign country must apply to the Department of Commerce for a reexport license if
the item is one that needs a Validated License for shipment from the United States to
a foreign country. Id. In the case where a foreign manufactured product contains 20%
or less of controlled parts originating in the United States, a reexport license is not
needed for export to Western countries. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Revision of
Controls on Foreign Products Incorporating U.S. Origin Parts, Components, and
Materials, 51 Fed. Reg. 24,533-24,535 (1986).
52. BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 12, at 123. Western Euro-
pean countries claim that the United States extraterritorial application of United
States law under the guise of military security is nothing less than technological impe-
rialism. Id.
53. Bingham & Johnson, supra note 16, at 906. Because of the inefficiency of its
licensing process, the United States does not deal expeditiously with the exception re-
quests of its Cocom partners. Id. These delays create tension within Cocom because
allies of the United States suspect that such delays give the United States a commer-
cial advantage. Id. Accord Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the
United States Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRaNs-
NAT'L L. 439, 439-40 (1981) (suggesting that a nation that tries to apply its laws to the
activities of another nation is often met with hostility).
54. The Export Administration Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Economic Policy of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 45 (1983); President's Special Report on Multilateral Export Controls 61, 67, 69-
71, reprinted in The Export Administration Act: Agenda for Reform: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on International Relations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978); Marcuss & Richard, supra note 53, at 439-40 (noting
that the extraterritorial application of United States trade laws has created global
tensions).
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The representatives to Cocom are diplomatic and technical experts in
dealing with the export control system.55 Delegates to Cocom are usu-
ally diplomats of modest rank specializing in commercial affairs. 0 Dur-
ing the negotiations on the contents of the embargo lists, expert teams
from the Departments of Defense and Commerce may assist the na-
tional representatives from the United States.57
B. ENFORCEMENT OF CocoM REGULATIONS
Because Cocom is a voluntary organization, it has limited capability
as a multilateral enforcement mechanism. 58 Responsibility for the en-
forcement of Cocom-based controls lies with each member's national
government, customs authorities, and police forces.5 9 Additionally,
there are no provisions for international sanctions against members who
do not comply with Cocom embargoes60 Cocom decisions, therefore,
function as non-binding recommendations to member governments that
impose no international legal obligation to embargo any of the listed
items.6 It is not difficult for the participating countries to evade Cocom
regulations because each country determines whether or not to bring a
given export before Cocom for its approval." Moreover, until the
55. Cocom Limitations, supra note 10, at 115.
56. Id.
57. Comment, Soviet Diversion of United States Technology: The Circumvention
of Cocom and U.S. Reexport Controls, and Proposed Solutions, 7 FORD. INT'L L.J.
561, 569 (1984).
58. Branting, Reconciliation of Conflicting Goals in the Export Administration
Act of 1979 - A Delicate Balance, 12 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 415, 445 (1980); Hunt,
supra note 11, at 1294.
59. Western Security, supra note 14, at 24. Diversion of Cocom controlled goods
through nonmember nations to embargoed destinations is a serious problem. Id. For
example, non Cocom members such as Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland provide im-
portant avenues of diversion for Cocom list items and act as direct sources for some
products on the Cocom list for purchase by the Soviet Union and other Communist
countries. Id.
60. Kiernan, The Export Administration Act Amendments of 1983: Foreign Avail-
ability of Controlled Goods and Technology, 11 J. LEGiS. 292, 304 (1984).
61. Cocom Limitations, supra note 10, at 119.
62. Bingham & Johnson, supra note 16, at 906. The Cyril Bath case illustrates
some major problems associated with Cocom. Id. at 905. In 1976, the Cyril Bath Com-
pany, a United States manufacturer of machine tools, applied for an export license to
ship ten metal-forming presses to the Soviet Union. Id. Initially, the United States
government denied the license on the grounds that the machinery posed a strategic
significance to the Soviet aeronautics industry. Id. Subsequently, the United States
government reversed itself on the basis of foreign availability of the item from France
and submitted the case to Cocom. Id. Investigations revealed that the French exported
these machines without ever seeking Cocom approval. Id. Cocom refused to grant the
exception to the Cyril Bath Company on the grounds that the French never admitted to
supplying comparable machines to the Soviet Union. Id. The French disregard for
Cocom controls on this technology highlights member annoyance with Cocom proce-
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Toshiba incident, the United States overlooked evasions of these con-
trols by its allies in order to avoid any pressure that might lead to the
demise of Cocom.63
1. Enforcement Mechanisms
A Cocom subcommittee on enforcement exchanges information on
national enforcement procedures to improve the effectiveness of the
Cocom export embargoes.8 4 Additionally, several enforcement mecha-
nisms are built into the Cocom regulations. The Import Certificate/
Delivery Verification (IC/DV) is one precaution against any diversion
of controlled dual-use products to Communist countries.08 The IC/DV
is an export documentation system that requires the recipient's govern-
ment to issue an import statement and a delivery verification statement
assuring that the importer will receive the goods and that the goods will
not be reexported without approval from the importer's governmental
authorities.6 Other precautionary measures include conducting an
"end-user" check67 to demand from the recipient a declaration of the
intended end-use and a pledge that such item will not be reexported to
a proscribed country68 or illegally diverted.69 These enforcement mech-
anisms, however, have ultimately proved insufficient to completely pre-
vent the Soviet Union from acquiring desirable Western technology.
II. THE TOSHIBA-KONGSBERG INCIDENT
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Toshiba-Kongsberg incident began when the Soviet Union re-
ceived covert information from the espionage ring led by convicted spy
John A. Walker Jr.70 and his family. The Walker espionage operation
dures and resulted in the Soviets obtaining arguably sensitive technologies while the
United States company lost a sale on equipment that may have been adjudged an ex-
ception. Id.
63. Id. at 906.
64. Hunt, supra note 11, at 1294.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 12, at 138.
68. Id.
69. id.
70. Chaze & Kaylor, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP., June 15, 1987, at 38. John
Walker pleaded guilty in 1985 to passing Navy secrets to the KGB. Id. The informa-
tion the Walkers divulged to the Soviets enabled Moscow to decipher top-secret traffic
on submarine tactics that is significant for acoustic detection capabilities. Id. There are
two distinct sounds that are created when a submarine propeller moves through the
water; the first is cavitation which is created when propeller blades cause pressure
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warned the Soviet Union that the United States could accurately track
Soviet submarines through excessive propeller noise.71 Having acquired
this information, the Soviet Union searched the West for the machine
tools necessary to produce a quieter submarine propeller blade."
Early in 1980, the Soviet foreign trade organization, Tekmashimport,
contacted Wako Koeki, a small Japanese trading firm with offices in
Moscow. 73 Negotiations in Moscow began when Wako Koeki ap-
proached Toshiba Machine, 74 who agreed to provide the necessary high
technology equipment . 5 Toshiba Machine admitted that it used its
standard export broker, C. Itoh & Company, to avoid raising the suspi-
cion of the Japanese export licensing officials."6 In addition, the Japa-
nese firms solicited the help of a Norwegian company, Kongsberg
Trade.7 Kongsberg Trade agreed to provide the computer equipment
necessary to run the machines as well as the propeller design and pro-
duction software.7 8
changes in seawater. Sanger, A Bizarre Deal Diverts Vital Tools to Russians, N.Y.
Times, June 12, 1987, at Al, D9. The second distinctive sound consists of blade tonals
caused as the propeller cuts through the wake created by appendages in the subma-
rine's hull. Id. at D9. An acoustics expert and professor of Ocean engineering, Ira
Dyer, noted the importance of submarine propeller noise. Id. He said that "[o]ne watt
of acoustical energy coming out of the propeller of a submarine in the Strait of Gibral-
tar can be heard off the coast of Virginia." Id.
71. See Chaze & Kaylor, supra note 69, at 38 (stating that the Soviets have over-
come deficiencies in their propeller system from information acquired by United States
Navy submariner John Walker's spy ring).
72. Peterson, Toshiba Aided Soviets With Sub Technology, Detroit News, Apr. 28,
1987, at 1, reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. S8991 (daily ed. June 30, 1987) (explaining
that once the Soviet Union learned of the extent of United States detection capabilities
they proceeded to purchase Western technology in order to produce quieter propeller
blades).
73. 133 CONG. REC. S8992 (daily ed. June 30, 1987) (statement of Sen. Shelby)
[hereinafter Shelby Statement].
74. Peterson, supra note 71, at I (stating that Toshiba Machine Corporation is a
subsidiary of Toshiba Corporation). Toshiba Corporation is the largest electronic con-
glomerate in Japan, selling more than 5,000 consumer and industrial products ranging
from VCRs and television sets to computerized machine tools and nuclear power plant
equipment. Id. There are more than 120,000 world-wide employees of Toshiba Corpo-
ration, with nearly 70,000 of them located outside Japan. Id. In 1985, Toshiba's assets
were in excess of $17.5 billion. Id.
75. Sanger, supra note 69, at Al. Toshiba's catalogue contained an MBP-1 10 pro-
peller milling machine worth $4 million to $5 million. Id. The Soviet Union desired this
particular model due to its nine independently controllable axes. Id. This feature ena-
bled the milling machine to construct highly sophisticated propellers. Id.
76. Shelby Statement, supra note 72, at S8993.
77. Peterson, Norwegian Defense Firm Stops Sales to Communist Nations, Detroit
News, June 18, 1987, at 3. Kongsberg Trade is a state-owned defense company and a
division of the Norwegian firm Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik. Id.
78. See Fossli, Oslo Threat To Links With Nato, Fin. Times, July 2, 1987, at 6
(arguing that Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik violated Cocom regulations when it exported
numerical control systems to the Soviet Union); see also Sanger, supra note 69, at D9
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During 1981, the parties negotiated five separate contracts. 9 The first
contract between Tekmashimport and C. Itoh & Company provided for
the delivery of four unspecified milling machines as well as providing
for service and spare parts for five years.80 The second contract be-
tween Kongsberg Trade and Tekmashimport provided for the purchase
of an NC-2000 numerical controller, which is the computer that guides
the milling machines, and an additional service agreement.," In a third
contract between Kongsberg Trade and Toshiba Machine, Kongsberg
agreed to supply the numerical controllers to Toshiba Machine for in-
stallation in the MBP-110 propeller milling machine, before shipment
by C. Itoh to the Soviet Union.82 The fourth and fifth contracts com-
mitted Kongsberg Trade and Toshiba to pay Wako Koeki a finder's fee
for orchestrating the arrangements. 3
To obtain the necessary export licenses for these contracts, both
Toshiba and Kongsberg submitted a false-end certificate indicating
that the machines contained only two axes instead of nine and that
their final destination was a civilian facility located in Leningrad."
When the United States learned of the illegal shipments and com-
plained, the Japanese and Norwegians investigated and discovered that
Toshiba and Kongsberg had engaged in a series of deceptive transac-
tions.85 Furthermore, American officials learned that the Toshiba-
(stating that the Soviet Union arranged for the purchase of the computer technology
from Bernhard John Green, a 49-year-old British national, who acted as Kongsberg
Trade's sales manager).
79. Shelby Statement, supra note 72, at S8993 (stating that five separate contracts





84. See A Leak That Could Sink The U.S. Lead In Submarines, Bus. WK, May
18, 1987, reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. S8991 (daily ed. June 30, 1987) (stating that
some of the equipment was actually installed at a naval shipyard on the Baltic Sea near
Leningrad).
85. See Technology Transfer, supra note 43, at 146 (stating that the Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is authorized to regulate the
transfer of technology to other nations). Export licensing in Japan is the sole preroga-
tive of (MITI). Id. There are no interagency boards or committees that oversee its
operation. Id. Suspicion Falls Also On MITI Staff Members, Cocom Violation; Memo
Suggesting "Evading of Prescriptions,", Yomiuri, May 28, 1987, at 27 (discussing that
in the course of applying for export approval, Toshiba Machine officials personally in-
fluenced staff members of MITI). In addition, a memo written by MITI to Toshiba
described ways that the company could evade the Cocom provisions. Id. The memo
provided a detailed and concrete explanation by a MITI staff member on the applica-
tion of the Cocom procedures and special points to be noted. Id.; see also Chandler,
Bright Lights, Big MITI, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1987, at 12 (suggesting that MITI
staff members may have advised Toshiba executives on ways to circumvent the Cocom
regulations). On May 19, 1981, Toshiba applied to MITI for a permit to ship a TDP
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Kongsberg sale of giant computer controlled milling machines was not
a one-time occurrence.86 For instance, the United States Embassy in
Tokyo revealed that in 1984 Toshiba had once again exported four five-
axis numerically controlled giant propeller making machines to the So-
viet Union.87
70/110 machine that was not listed in Toshiba's sales brochures. Id.; see also Sanger,
supra note 69, at Al (stating that Toshiba declared that the machine it wished to
export was limited to two axes, and so falls within the Cocom specifications, and that it
was intended for use in an electric power utility in Leningrad). None of the export
control inspectors of MITI questioned the license. Id. Likewise, none of the Japanese
officials discovered that the machine ultimately shipped was not the one listed on the
export permit. Id.; see also Soviet Technical Engineers Were Also Invited To Visit
Plants and to Check on Machines, Nihon Keizai, July 1, 1987, at 27 (stating that over
a period of eighteen months, engineers from both Japan and Norway returned to the
Soviet Union six times to install the four milling machines). Toshiba Machine invited
Soviet technical engineers to Japan to confirm the performance of these processing ma-
chines. Id. Soviet technical engineers visited Japan four times, over a period that coin-
cided with the time of the exports of the four milling machines. Id. The group of tech-
nical engineers from the Soviet Union checked the processing machines that they
ordered and held consultations with technical experts of the Toshiba Machine Com-
pany. Id.; see also Sanger, supra note 69, at Al (stating that the equipment shipments,
the falsified export licenses, and the visits between Leningrad and Japan were appar-
ently undetected by Western intelligence agencies until 1985). There is no consensus on
how the United States and Japan ultimately discovered the leak. Id. Japanese officials
contend that the news was leaked in December of 1985, when Kazuo Kamugai, the
Moscow office manager of the Wako Koeki trading firm, told an official of Wako and
Toshiba Machine that he would disclose the story of the illegal exports unless someone
paid him to remain silent. Id. When he did not receive any money, he allegedly wrote a
letter to Cocom uncovering the illegal sale. Id. The United States subsequently re-
ceived this information. Id. Pentagon officials, on the other hand, maintain that rather
than a letter, they received a series of clues that led them to discover the deception and
link the Japanese and Norwegians to the illegal sale. Id. The incident did not become
public knowledge until a Detroit newspaper printed the story on April 27, 1987. Shelby
Statement, supra note 72, at S8993.
86. See 133 CONG. REc. S8372 (daily ed. June 19, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Helms) (calling the Toshiba and Kongsberg history a "pattern of betrayal"); see also
Sanger, supra note 69, at Al (stating that the managers of Toshiba Machine burned
any incriminating documents in their files when the United States and Japan discov-
ered the diversion and also renamed any high-tech equipment that would tend to make
export officials suspicious). In another incident, Japan was investigated for selling high
technology products in violation of Cocom regulations. Id. This incident similarly in-
volved the sale of nine-axis-type numerically-controlled propeller-making machinery to
the Soviet Union. Id.
87. Toshiba Broke Cocom Rules in 1984 Also, Mainichi Daily News, June 19,
1987, at 1, reprinted in 133 CoNG. REC. S8372 (daily ed. June 19, 1987). The five-axis
milling machines are the second largest of the propeller-making machines Toshiba
manufactured after the nine-axis machines. Id. While United States officials previously
thought that the Soviet Union used Toshiba's nine-axis machines to make submarine
propellers, they now believe that the Soviet Union used the five-axis machines to make
submarine propellers and the nine-axis machines to make aircraft carriers. Id.
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INCIDENT
Both the United States and the Soviet Union believe that submarines
are the weapon that will dictate which superpower controls vital sea
lanes in any future military exchange."' Each year, both the United
States and the Soviet Union spend billions of dollars constructing sub-
marines and developing anti-submarine warfare tactics. 9 Although the
United States still retains a lead over the Soviet Union in submarine
technology,90 the Soviet Union has acquired Western submarine tech-
nology illegally and has significantly narrowed this lead."' In what is
referred to as "the most harmful transfer of militarily sensitive technol-
ogy in over a decade," 92 the Soviet Union is now able to manufacture
quieter submarine propellers because of the equipment received from
the Japanese and the Norwegian companies. 3 One Pentagon official
estimated that as a result of this illegal transfer, the Soviet Union
gained seven to ten years in propeller development and that the United
States will need to spend approximately $25 to $30 billion in anti-sub-
marine warfare development over the next fifteen to twenty years to
counteract the Soviet gains.94
88. See Chaze & Kaylor, supra note 69, at 36 (stating that each superpower is
spending billions of dollars to build a new generation of submarine that is faster, qui-
eter, stronger, and deadlier).
89. Id. (noting that both the Soviet Union and the United States are committed to
better antisubmarine tactics in an effort to tip the scales in the struggle to control the
seas).
90. Id. at 37 (stating that the United States now has 96 nuclear attack submarines
as well as 37 strategic submarines). By comparison, the Soviets have 350 submarines,
including 265 attack and cruise-missile vessels. Id. One hundred and forty-one of these
submarines are posted to the Soviet Northern Fleet. Id. The United States has spent in
excess of $1.4 billion to design a new class of attack submarine, the SSN-21 Seawolf,
which the navy predicts will be the world's deadliest and stealthiest when it puts to sea
at the end of 1994. Id.
91. Id. at 38 (noting that Adm. Lee Baggett, United States commander of
NATO's Atlantic forces, conceded that the lead of the United States in submarine
defenses has shrunk dramatically). In addition to the illegal acquisition of Western
secrets, the Soviet Union has made new submarine advances on its own. Id. New Soviet
attack submarines, named Mike, Sierra, and Akula, are 100 times quieter then the
older Soviet submarines. Id.
92. Id. at 42.
93. See Wilson, Soviets Score Silent Success in Undersea Race with the United
States, Wash. Post, July 17, 1987, at Al (stating that firms in Japan and Norway were
suspected as the culprits in aiding the Soviet Union to produce quieter propellers able
to avoid detection).
94. Sneider, Japan Disputes U.S. View of Damage Done by Toshiba Sale, Chris-
tian Sci. Monitor, July 20, 1987, at 11. See 133 CoNG. REC. S9001 (daily ed. June 30,
1987) (statement of Sen. Helms) (stating that prior to this betrayal of the Western
Alliance, NATO antisubmarine warfare specialists could pick up the sounds of Soviet
submarines from 200 miles away, or roughly the distance from Washington to New
York). After the Toshiba incident, the distance decreased to 10 miles. Id. This is more
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III. RESPONSES To THE INCIDENT
A. RESPONSE IN NORWAY
In the aftermath of the Toshiba-Kongsberg incident, the government
of Norway has expressed concern over the loss of strategic technology
and the desire to address the problem. 95 Upon learning of Kongsberg's
involvement in the sale, the Norwegian government closed down Kong-
sberg Trading Company, including its Moscow office, and terminated
all software and hardware support activities for equipment already de-
livered."8 Norway also barred those individuals who participated in the
illegal sales to the Soviet bloc, whether or not directly involved in the
case, from any future employment by Kongsberg.9 7 Moreover, the Nor-
wegian government filed criminal charges against the manager of the
Kongsberg Trading Company for providing false information to the
Norwegian licensing authorities.9
Furthermore, the government initiated a formal review of all Kong-
sberg export licenses issued since 1970.1" Additionally, the Norwegian
government proposed a new comprehensive export control law.100 Provi-
sions of the new law upgrade the Norwegian licensing system immedi-
ately to include random checks of internal company procedures, to in-
crease the number of licensing personnel by approximately 50 percent,
than enough to allow the Soviet ballistic missile submarines to evade detection on the
open sea. Id.; see also Auerbach, Another High-Tech Sale to Soviets by Toshiba Re-
ported, Wash. Post, June 20, 1987, at C2 [hereinafter Another High-Tech Sale] (stat-
ing that the cost of modifying United States detection equipment to pick up the quieter
Soviet submarines could run to more than $10 billion). Pentagon officials estimate the
cost to the United States at between $25 and $30 billion to recapture the level of
superior capabilities once enjoyed by United States submarines. Id.
95. Toshiba-Kongsberg Technology Diversion Case: Hearings before the Subcom.
on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987) [hereinafter Technology Diversion
Hearings); DeYoung, Norway Irked by U.S. View on High-Tech Sale, Wash. Post,
July 19, 1987, at A17.
96. See Fossli, supra note 77, at 6 (stating that the government of Norway an-
nounced that it plans to reorganize Kongsberg as a defense equipment corporation).
The company is not allowed to have any future dealings commercial or otherwise, with
any Soviet bloc country. Id. At present, Kongsberg has a development contract through
the Norwegian Navy, with the United States Navy, to supply Penguin missiles to the
United States military). Should Kongsberg lose this contract, it could also lose other
military markets including Australia, Canada, and Spain which would prove disastrous




100. Fossli, supra note 77, at 6. The new control law in Norway proposes to extend
the statute of limitations for export control violations from two to ten years, increase
penalties and fines against firms and individuals, and apply export controls to transfer
of services, technologies, and products. Id.
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and to alert Norwegian customs officials to planned exports in order to
permit shipment checks as well as for the seizure of additional Kong-
sberg documents on "suspicion of illegal acts."1 1
B. RESPONSE IN JAPAN
On May 15, 1987, soon after Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of
Japan learned of the incident, two top executives10 2 of Toshiba Corpo-
ration'03 resigned in acknowledgment of the company's embarrassment
over the sale of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union by one of its
subsidiaries.104 Additionally, the president and three other executives of
Toshiba Machine resigned and two of the company's employees were
arrested after the disclosure of the sales.10 5 The charges against the
Toshiba executives were all based on violations of the Foreign Ex-
change and Foreign Trade Control Law of Japan.100
The Japanese government prohibited C. Itoh, one of Japan's largest
trading companies, from exporting any machine tools to the Soviet bloc
for three months beginning May 22, 1987.107 The Japanese government
101. Id.
102. Walters, Two Top Toshiba Executives Quit Over Soviet Sales, L.A. Times,
July 2, 1987, at 1. The two Toshiba executives who resigned were Chairman Shoichi
Saba and President Sugiichiro Watari. Id. The resignations were viewed by the Japa-
nese public as serious setbacks to Toshiba, the third largest manufacturer of electrical
equipment in Japan. Id.
103. Japan Was Alerted To Toshiba's Exports To Soviet, Baltimore Sun, July 3,
1987, at Di. Toshiba Corporation is the parent corporation of Toshiba Machine Corpo-
ration. Id.; Walters, supra note 102, at 1. The Toshiba Corporation earns approxi-
mately 10% of its sales in the United States and its market share in the United States
is approximately $2.3 billion. Id. The Toshiba Corporation sold an estimated S4 billion
worth of goods to the United States last year. Japan Vows Noninterference in US.
Drive to Bar Toshiba, Wash. Post, July 3, 1987, at 63.
104. Walters, supra note 102, at 1. The Chairman of Toshiba said that his resigna-
tion was not prompted by any action taken in the Senate or by pressure from either the
Japanese or United States governments. Id. Resignation is considered the highest form
of apology and expression of regret in the Japanese system. Id. In Japan, it is not
uncommon for the heads of corporations to resign when the company experiences seri-
ous problems. Id.
105. Id. The resignations of Toshiba Chairman Shoichi Saba and President Sugu
Chero Wakani were a solemn acknowledgement of the company embarrassment over
sales of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union by one of its subsidiaries. Id.
106. Japanese Cabinet Decides to Tighten Penalties For Multilateral Export Con-
trols Violations, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 979 (Aug. 5, 1987) [hereinafter Japanese
Cabinet Decides to Tighten Penalties].
107. Id. at 7. The Japanese government imposed several administrative measures
against Toshiba Machine Company, C. Itoh & Company, and Wako Kocki for their
role in the diversion. Id. One of the measures enjoined Toshiba Machine from all com-
merce with J4 countries of the Soviet bloc for one year beginning on May 22, 1987. Id.
In addition, the Japanese government prohibited the company from delivering any
goods, providing any spare parts, and servicing equipment in Cocom proscribed desti-
nations. Id. at 8. The government prohibited the company from engaging in commer-
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also amended the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law of
Japan in an effort to tighten penalties for violations of Cocom rules'0 8
and formed an additional high level strategic goods export council to
evaluate the shipment of suspect high technology items. 09 Addition-
ally, many Japanese companies have voluntarily begun to hire outside
counsel to conduct extensive investigations of their companies for other
possible Cocom violations." i0 Japan also offered to double the size of its
export-licensing staff and to increase its financial contributions to
Cocom. 111 Furthermore, the United States and Japan agreed to ex-
change teams of visiting export control experts to help raise the quality
of the Japanese export control system to that of the United States."'
This incident differs from prior illicit transfers of dual-use technol-
ogy by the Japanese to Soviet-Bloc countries."13 What makes the
cial contracts of any kind with Cocom proscribed countries during the one year period.
Id. Moreover, the Japanese government prohibited C. Itoh, Japan's largest trading
company, from exporting any machine tools to proscribed destinations for three
months. Id. The government issued a letter of reprimand to Wako Koeki for its role in
the diversion. Id. See Technology Diversion Hearings, supra note 95, at 4 (stating that
MITI proposes to extend the one-year ban on shipments by Toshiba Machine Company
to three years).
108. Japanese Cabinet Decides to Tighten Penalties, supra note 106, at 979. The
amendment increases the jail penalties for Cocom violators from three to five years and
increases the time for administrative sanctions from one to three years. Id. The amend-
ment also requires MITI approval for exports of 178 items and technologies embargoed
for national security reasons to East bloc countries. Id. In addition, the Foreign Minis-
try proposes to adopt the responsibility of enforcing controls on exports of sensitive
items. Id. Before, MITI had the sole responsibility of controlling such items. Id.
109. Id. at 980. The purpose of the strategic goods export council is to review all
applications for exports to Soviet bloc nations involving high-level computers, machine
tools, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and nuclear energy-related equipment.
Id.
110. Id. at 980. Major Japanese trading companies started to develop their own
internal systems to prevent similar Cocom violations. Id. For instance, in August of
1987, Nissan Motors established a committee designed to prevent Cocom violations of
exports to the Soviet bloc. Id.
111. See Cullison, Japan to Brief U.S. on Efforts to Curb Export Violations,
Wash. Post, July 14, 1987, at 5 (stating that MITI also plans to double the number of
its Cocom regulation inspectors, bringing the number up to 80 from the current 34 by
April); Lachica, Japanese Move to Appease U.S. In Toshiba Case, Wall St. J., July
17, 1987, at 16 [hereinafter Japanese Move to Appease] (stating that Japan has
pledged to increase its financial contributions to the multilateral export-control
agency); accord Keeping Our Technology, supra note 22, at 16 (stating that Norway
has only six officials overseeing its export-licensing system). The United States has 488
officials in the Office of Export Licensing of the Department of Commerce. Id. In addi-
tion, more than one hundred people in the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy
are involved in this type of monitoring of export licenses. Id.
112. Japanese Move to Appease, supra note 111, at 16.
113. See generally Sternheimer, supra note 42, at 17-18 (discussing previous inci-
dents of illicit transfers of militarily significant technology by Ishikawajina-Harima
Heavy Industries (IHI)). For example, MITI ignored Cocom restrictions in the case of
the "floating dock" involving IHI and the Soviet Union. Id. IHI sold the Soviets a
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Toshiba-Kongsberg case unique is not only the size of the transaction,
but also the fact that there was no effort to disguise the destination of
the equipment by sending it through third countries. From the outset of
the incident, Toshiba Corporation instead maintained that few Toshiba
Machine employees knew the true power or use of the equipment
shipped to the Soviet Union and that officials at the parent company
were completely unaware of the transaction."
IV. THREE POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE TOSHIBA-
KONGSBERG INCIDENT
The most serious threat to Cocom as a viable safeguard of Western
security is the deliberate evasion of Cocom procedures by its member
nations. 15 The Toshiba-Kongsberg diversion of sensitive technology to
the Soviet Union illustrates the weakness of Cocom and the need for
improvement of its enforcement mechanisms. To assess the potential
for increasing Cocom's effectiveness in light of the most recent Soviet
illegal acquisition of highly sensitive technology, this Comment dis-
cusses three different responses: 1) a unilateral response to the incident
by the United States; 2) a bilateral remedy; and 3) an attempt at in-
creasing the effectiveness of Cocom through various multilateral
channels.
A. UNILATERAL RESPONSE BY THE UNITED STATES
1. The Garn Amendment
When the United States Congress learned of the Toshiba-Kongsberg
sale of sophisticated marine technology to the Soviet Union, many
members proposed strong action against the two companies who vio-
lated Cocom regulations. 6 Following the incident, both the House and
the Senate presented a number of bills designed to sanction Toshiba
$48.6 million floating dock with a lifting capacity of 80,000 tons; the largest such dock
in the Soviet Union. Id. The sale of this dock had significant military implications. Id.
The Japanese Defense Agency suggested that the dock could be used for military pur-
poses, but MITI disregarded this advice and allowed the license to stand. Id.
114. Sanger, supra note 69, at Al.
115. Bingham & Johnson, supra note 16, at 906.
116. See Toshiba Bashing, Wall St. J., July 2, 1987, at 18 (stating that when the
United States learned of the diversion, ten members of the House of Representatives
smashed Toshiba radios with sledgehammers on the lawn of the Capitol); Chandler,
supra note 84, at 12 (stating that the Japanese inserted a full-page advertisement in
newspapers across the country apologizing for the illegal sale). Id.; Technology Diver-
sion Hearings, supra note 95, at 1-2 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (stating that the
Toshiba-Kongsberg incident represents one of the most egregious diversions of high
technology products to the Soviet Union).
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and Kongsberg. 117 Senator Jake Garn proposed an amendment to the
trade bill" 8 in an attempt to close the American market to any foreign
117. See Strobel, Toshiba Tie to U.S.S.R. Deepens, Alarms Hill, Wash. Times,
June 19, 1987, at 2 (discussing a number of bills calling for sanctions against Toshiba
and Kongsberg); Lachica, U.S. Asks Allies To Curb Exports to Soviet Union, Wall St.
J., June 22, 1987, at 22 (discussing congressional threats to ban Toshiba and Kong-
sberg from United States markets for two years or more); see e.g. H.R. 2948, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (prohibiting the Department of Defense from purchasing any
product manufactured or assembled by Toshiba America, Toshiba Corp., or any of its
affiliates or subsidiaries); H.R. 2241, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (prohibiting the
importation of all goods from Toshiba Corporation or any of its affiliates or subsidiaries
into the United States). Under this Act, the Secretary of Defense may not enter into
any contracts with these two companies. Id. Another bill proposed by Representative
Donald Lukens (R. Ohio) would allow a two year "adjustment period" to enable
American companies the opportunity to find alternative suppliers. Id.; H.R. 2731,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (prohibiting any federal agency from procuring goods
from firms that have jeopardized the national security of the United States); H.R.
2698, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (prohibiting any goods produced by the Toshiba
Corporation of Japan, the Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik Company of Norway, or their sub-
sidiaries, from entering, or withdrawing from any warehouse for consumption into the
customs territory of the United States for a five-year period); H.R. 2948, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987) (prohibiting the Department of Defense from purchasing any product
manufactured or assembled by Toshiba America Inc., or Toshiba Corporation for the
purpose of resale of such product in a military exchange store); H.R. 3000, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (prohibiting the Department of Defense from purchasing any
product manufactured or assembled by Toshiba America, Inc., Toshiba Corp., or the
Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik Company of Norway or their subsidiaries); H.R. 3020, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) (prohibiting the Department of Defense from purchasing Pen-
guin Antiship missiles); accord H.R. 3026, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (imposing
sanctions against persons who violate regulations issued by any country pursuant to the
Cocom agreement if the violation substantially enhances East-bloc capabilities in criti-
cal technologies); H.R. 3047, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (providing for annual re-
view by the President to determine the extent to which each participating country in
Cocom is complying with the Cocom transfer provisions); H.R. 3079, 100th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1987) (prohibiting the Secretary of Defense from entering into contracts with
the Toshiba Corporation and Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik); S. 1639, 100th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1987) (prohibiting the export of defense or defense related goods by persons using the
services of trading companies that have violated export controls promulgated by
Cocom); Amendment 355 to H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (prohibiting the
importation of products of the Toshiba Corporation and Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik); S.
1399C, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (prohibiting the importation of products of the
Toshiba Corporation or the Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik or any of its direct affiliates or
subsidiaries into the United States); 133 CONG. REC. S8998 (daily ed. June 30, 1987)
(statement of Rep. Garn) (proposing to amend H.R. 3 by attaching Amendment 359).
This amendment is more commonly referred to as the Garn Amendment. Id. It will
help protect United States national security by penalizing companies that divert ad-
vanced technology to the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Id.
118. 133 CONG. REC. S8998 (daily ed. June 30, 1987). The Senate rejected an
amendment by Senator Richard C. Shelby (D. Ala.), H.R. 1399, that sought to imple-
ment a permanent ban on all Toshiba and Kongsberg sales in the United States.
Auerbach, Senate Approves Two-Year Ban On Toshiba's Sales in U.S. Wash. Post,
July 1, 1987, at 1. The vote was 78 to 19 against the Shelby amendment. Id.; Sneider,
Japan Disputes U.S. View of Damage Done By Toshiba Sale, Christian Sci. Monitor,
July 20, 1987, at 11. The Garn Amendment was incorporated into the Omnibus Trade
& Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
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firm that sells significant military technology to Warsaw Pact na-
tions.119 If enacted, this penalty would amount to the stiffest sanction
ever imposed for violations of export control rules in the history of
Cocom.120
Specifically, the Garn Amendment applies mandatory sanctions
against Toshiba and Kongsberg.' 2' The sanctions prohibit imports from
these two companies for not less than two years nor more than five
years. "'22 The amendment bans imports from the parent companies,
their affiliates, and the subsidiaries of the companies involved with the
technology diversion. 23 In addition, the sanctions preclude Toshiba and
Kongsberg from contracting with any department, agency, or instru-
mentality of the United States government. 24 There is also a prohibi-
tion of importation into the United States of any goods produced by
Toshiba, Kongsberg, or by firms that violate Cocom regulations. 125 The
amendment, however, allows the President to make exemptions in cer-
tain instances.126 Additionally, under the proposed bill, the President
may, after consultation with Congress, limit the scope of the sanctions
with regard to coverage of the parent, affiliate, subsidiary, and succes-
sor companies of the foreign person who violated the Cocom
regulations. 27
One section of the Garn Amendment deals with the establishment of
119. 133 CONG. REC. S8997 (daily ed. June 30, 1987). Co-sponsors of the Garn
Amendment included Senators Heinz, Proxmire, Helms, D'Amato, Dixon, Glenn, Mc-
Cain, DeConcini, and Hatch. Id.
120. Id.
121. Amendment 359 to H.R. 3, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 133 CoNG.
REC. S8996 (1987). There are two separate parts to this amendment, one to punish
Toshiba Corporation and Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik specifically, and a second part that
makes the amendment applicable to future occurrences of illegal technology diversions.
Id. The amendment contains severable sections in the event that a court finds the sec-
tion applicable to Toshiba and Kongsberg unconstitutional. Id.
122. Id. § a.
123. Id. § b.
124. Id. § b(l).
125. Id. § b(2).
126. See 133 CONG. REC. S8996 § c (daily ed. June 30, 1987) (stating that the
President is not required to apply sanctions in certain situations). Exemptions may ap-
ply to the procurement of defense articles or defense services; to existing contracts or
subcontracts; where the company or individual in question is a sole source supplier of
that essential defense article, or where such goods are vital to the national security of
the United States. Id. Additionally, there is no requirement that the President apply
sanctions to imports shipped under contracts signed before May 1, 1987, to spare parts
and component parts, to routine servicing and maintenance of products already sup-
plied, or to information and technology may be exempt from any sanctions. Id. § c(2).
127. Id. § d. This amendment requires the President to report to Congress within
six months after the enactment of this Act should sanctions be levied against Toshiba
Corporation and Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik and semi-annually on the status of any other
sanctions that are applied in the future. Id. § e.
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greater multilateral cooperation between the members of the Cocom
Coordinating Committee. 12 8 This section provides that the President
shall negotiate with members of the Coordinating Committee and with
other countries to achieve greater national security through export con-
trols.'2 9 Moreover, the final section of the Garn Amendment provides
for government to government discussions regarding compensation to
the United States from the company or individual in violation of
Cocom.1 30 The amendment provides that increased costs of research,
development, and the procurement of new defensive systems should de-
termine the amount of compensation required by the diversion of criti-
cal military technology to East bloc countries.' 3'
2. Response to the Garn Amendment
The Reagan administration firmly opposes the legislation imposing
sanctions against Toshiba and Kongsberg for their role in the diversion
of sophisticated technology to the Soviet Union. 13 2 The administration
believes that if the United States takes punitive action against these
two firms, other countries may take similar actions against the United
States in retaliation.' 3 In addition, the Reagan administration believes
that unilateral sanctions may potentially weaken the Coordinating
Committee because members may be more reluctant to continue their
participation in the organization if the United States alone punishes
them for what it decides are infractions of Cocom rules and
regulations. 34
Shortly after the introduction of this legislation, several of the largest
and most influential corporations in the United States began a con-
certed lobbying effort to block the proposed Garn Amendment.' 35 Like-
128. Id. § 7.
129. Id. Pursuant to the Garn Amendment, the following standards of cooperation
are suggested to achieve greater national security for the United States and its Allies:
high quality review of license applications; publication of control lists and education of
the public to the need for better controls; coordination of licensing and enforcement
efforts among members, uniform interpretation of controls; appreciation by the Coordi-
nating Committee of the seriousness of violations of national security export controls;
improved channels of information sharing; implementation of a standard destination
control statement on all shipping documents accompanying controlled items; and effec-
tive enforcement cooperation at the working level. Id.
130. Id. § 8.
131. Id.
132. Administration Firmly Opposed to Toshiba Sanctions Legislation,
Freedenberg Says, 4 Int. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1009 (Aug. 12, 1987) [hereinafter Ad-
ministration Opposed to Toshiba Sanctions].
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Rasky, Top U.S. Corporations Lobbying Against Curb On Toshiba Im-
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wise, they argue that companies contend that the ban on imports of
Toshiba Corporation products may cost United States businesses bil-
lions of dollars.136 Likewise, the ban may also cause thousands of
American workers to lose their jobs."3" Moreover, American companies
realize that their relationships with Toshiba and other foreign high
technology companies are so complex and intertwined that there is vir-
tually no way to avoid serious and widespread economic damage if the
United States imposes unilateral sanctions.1 38
Because this diversion did not specifically involve any United States
goods or technology, this reinforces the notion that the United States
cannot pursue export controls unilaterally.1 39 The seriousness of this in-
cident for Western security underscores the need for cooperation be-
tween the United States and its Cocom partners. 140 The effective con-
trol of technology through a voluntary mechanism such as Cocom
depends entirely on the cooperation of all its members to ensure uni-
form enforcement of its principles.' 4
The Toshiba-Kongsberg diversion was not a marginal violation of
Cocom export controls.14 ' The diversion was a transaction that fell
ports, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1987, at 1 [hereinafter U.S. Corporations Lobby Against
Toshiba Curb] (stating that the companies who would be affected by this legislation
include American Telephone & Telegraph, General Electric, Hewlett-Packard, Honey-
well, IBM, Motorola, Rockwell, United Technologies, and Xerox).
136. Id. The ban would also apply to Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik, but Kongsberg sells
almost no goods in the United States. Id. at D12..
137. See Vieth, Toshiba Import Ban Expected to Have Little Impact on US.
Units, L.A. Times, July 2, 1987, at IV-I (stating that Toshiba employs about 4,000
American workers, including an estimated 1,200 in California, 650 in Tennessee, 520
in Texas, 260 in New Jersey and 200 in Illinois). The largest United States subsidiary
is Toshiba America Corporation of New York which accounts for S.5 billion of
Toshiba's United States sales and 2,300 of its American employees. Id.
138. See U.S. Corporations Lobby Against Curb On Toshiba Imports, supra note
135, at D12 (noting that Apple Computer said that the proposed legislation would
affect it because the printer for its desktop publishing system is made under a sole-
source arrangement with Toshiba); see also COMPUTER AND BUSINESS EQuiP?.tENr
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, THE UNITED STATES CAN RESPOND To THE DIVER-
SION OF TECHNOLOGY To THE SOVIET UNION BY SUBSIDIARIES OF KONGSBERG AND
TOSHIBA WITHOUT UNNECESSARILY HARMING THE UNITED STATES COMPUTER AND
BUSINESS EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY, at 3.
139. Technology Diversion Hearings, supra note 95, at 10 (statement of Sen.
Dixon).
140. Id.
141. See Plousadis, Soviet Diversion of United States Technology: The Circumven-
tion of Cocom and United States Reexport Controls, and Proposed Solutions, 7 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 561, 589-90 (1984) (stating that the purpose of the Cocom treaty is to
enlist greater member nation cooperation in preventing diversions, and this cannot be
achieved through United States unilateral policy making). Cocom member states are
reluctant to elevate Cocom to treaty status, therefore, greater use of persuasion is
needed to obtain member cooperation. Id.
142. See Technology Diversion Hearings, supra note 95, at 13 (statement of Dr.
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squarely within a category of high technology transfers where all par-
ties agree that enforcement of export controls is absolutely necessary.""
This is an ideal case to demonstrate to Cocom members that the
United States is justified in pressing for rigorous enforcement of uni-
form standards. Unilaterally imposed sanctions in the immediate after-
math of the Toshiba-Kongsberg diversion, however, might weaken new
incentives for multilateral cooperation.' 44 It is not possible for the
United States to substitute its own enforcement for Cocom in all
cases. 45 This is especially true in cases where a foreign company does
not have significant dealings with the United States and diverts sensi-
tive technology.' 46 The United States should approach the enforcement
of export controls with care when such unilateral attempts at enforce-
ment can harm foreign nationals.147 Except when used as a temporary
measure, the application of unilateral controls undermines the incentive
of the allies to develop a sound basis for multilateral restrictions. 48
Unilateral controls may actually undermine attempts at coordinating a
multilateral effort to control significant military items and, as a result,
may actually strengthen the Soviet Union militarily. 49
United States export laws do not reach violations of Japanese export
controls or violations of Cocom controls by Japanese citizens selling
goods or technology that are wholly of foreign origin.15 0 Moreover, even
if Cocom were to be considered a treaty, the United States does not
have authority under international law to enforce treaty obligations
Paul Freedenberg, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administration) (stat-
ing that the Toshiba-Kongsberg diversion was one of the most significant cases of tech-
nology diversion over the last decade with profound deleterious effects on the strategic
posture of the United States).
143. Sanger, A Bizarre Deal Diverts Vital Tools to Russians, N.Y. Times, June
12, 1987, at 1.
144. Technology Diversion Hearings, supra note 95, at 5 (statement of E. Allen
Wendt, Senior Representative for Strategic Technology Policy).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 3.
147. 134 CONG. REc. S10,729 (daily ed., Aug. 3, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Bradley).
148. East/West Economic Relations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Economic Policy of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1981) (statement of Lawrence Brady, Assist. Secretary for Trade Admin.,
Dept. of Commerce).
149. See Root, Trade Controls That Work, 52 FOREIGN POL'Y 68, 69 (1984) (stat-
ing that the use of unilateral sanctions has slowed the entire process of establishing
effective multilateral controls over militarily significant items, and has pushed Western
bickering into the open, further enhancing the Soviet position).
150. 15 C.F.R. § 374 (1988). The United States maintains the right to control
goods of United States origin which are subject to reexport controls. Id.
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against private Japanese persons. 151 Additionally, attempts to penalize
foreign private entities in these circumstances may set a precedent
whereby other Cocom members could ban imports in the future from
the United States companies that violate United States export control
laws or other United States statutes with foreign implications.5
Therefore, before taking the extraordinary step of imposing economic
penalties against foreign companies violating foreign law, the United
States should first ensure that non-United States perpetrators of diver-
sions are punished as contemplated in the international legal system by
the countries with direct jurisdiction, Japan and Norway.5 3 Japanese
individuals and companies who violate export control restrictions should
receive the same treatment as United States individuals and corpora-
tions. In the United States it is the responsibility of the Department of
Commerce to administer sanctions against American violators.'
Therefore, the United States should withhold sanctions against Japan
until the Department of Commerce determines that the response from
the Japanese is deficient. A determination by the Secretary of Com-
merce that Japanese sanctions already imposed are less rigorous than
United States sanctions for the same violation may indicate the need
for further sanctions by the United States.
If the foregoing conditions are not met and the United States does
impose sanctions, these sanctions are meaningful only if imposed
against those directly responsible. 55 In the present case, there is no
evidence that Toshiba Machine's parent company, Toshiba Corpora-
tion, either participated in or had knowledge of Toshiba Machine's sale
of proscribed equipment to the Soviet Union. 6 Moreover, in the
151. See Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, 27-29 (1973), re-
printed in INTERNATIONAL LAW MATERIALS, supra note 20, at 355 (stating that inter-
national treaty obligations cannot be enforced against private individuals).
152. Administration Opposed to Toshiba Sanctions, supra note 132, at 1009.
153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403(i) (1965) (limiting a states jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
persons or entities located in another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable); see also Overkill Could Backfire, Chicago Sun-Times, July 6, 1987, at
21 (stating that any punishment should be imposed by the countries whose companies
were responsible).
154. See 1986 EAA REPORT, supra note 28, at 1 (stating that the Department of
Commerce employs the Office of Export Enforcement to investigate and report viola-
tions of export controls).
155. 134 CONG. REC. S10,729 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Bradley).
156. See Auerbach, Another High-Tech Sale, supra note 93, at C2 (stating that
the Toshiba Corporation of Japan should not be held liable for the transgressions of a
subsidiary). Although the chairman and the president of the parent corporation re-
signed, there is no indication to date that they were responsible for the violations. Id.;
see also 134 CONG. REc. S10,728 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1988) (noting that there is no
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Toshiba-Kongsberg diversion case it is unlikely that the parent com-
pany will realize any derivative profits from the transaction because
sanctions already imposed by Japan will lead to millions of dollars of
losses for Toshiba Machine. 57
United States law generally does not charge an unknowing parent
corporation for the conduct of its subsidiary.158 There is no reason why
the United States should depart from this doctrine in its attempts to
punish the consequences of private foreign violations of foreign law or
international agreements. 15 Before the United States attempts to initi-
ate any action in the area of import restrictions, efforts to more accu-
rately identify those who are actually culpable are justifiable. Specifi-
cally, sanctions should issue against Toshiba Machine and any other
affiliates that have participated in the transaction or helped to conceal
the violation.'60
If the United States decides to punish Japanese and Norwegian com-
panies through import restraints, it should not penalize American com-
panies that rely on Toshiba Corporation or its subsidiaries for parts and
supplies. 6 ' Trade sanctions could have a serious detrimental effect on
American consumers of Toshiba products. 62 A flat ban on Toshiba im-
credible evidence that Toshiba Corporation knew or participated in activity taken by
Toshiba Machine). But see The Toshiba Case And Transfer of High Technology
(WETA FM Radio NPR Network, radio broadcast, June 27, 1987) (statement by Bill
Busenberg, reporter from London) (suggesting that Japanese press reports indicated
that company and MITI officials knew they were dealing with KGB agents, and so did
the Trade Ministry, but all ignored the warning signs and allowed the sale to go
through).
157. See Toshiba Probing Soviet Deal, Chicago Tribune, June 25, 1987, § 3, at 2
(stating that the Defense Department has recently said that it will stop approving con-
tracts with Toshiba Corporation). This decision will cost Toshiba hundreds of millions
of dollars. Id.; see also Lachica, U.S. Temporarily Suspends Authority of Toshiba,
Kongsberg To Ship U.S. Goods, Wall St. J., July 8, 1987, at 15 (stating that the
Pentagon has postponed a decision about whether to allow Toshiba to bid to supply
United States "lap top" computers to the Air Force).
158. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF CORPORA-
TIONS, 355 § 148 (3d ed. 1983 ed. & Supp. 1986) (stating that the parent corporation
and its subsidiary are treated as separate and distinct legal persons even though the
parent may own all the shares of the subsidiary). If there is evidence that a parent
corporation has utilized its subsidiary to evade liability, United States law allows the
complainant to press its claim against the parent corporation. Id.
159. Rosenblatt, Toshiba Executives Unaware of Sale to Soviets, Wash. Post,
Sept. 10, 1987, at E4.
160. U.S. Corporations Lobby Against Curb on Toshiba Imports, supra note 135,
at D12.
161. CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 3, OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS
ACT OF 1988, reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. H1863, H2092 (daily ed. April 20, 1988)
[hereinafter TRADE BILL CONFERENCE REPORT].
162. See Toshiba Bashing, supra note 116, at 18 (arguing that rather than using
this incident for further trade bashing, the United States should try to pressure the two
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ports would force United States assembly lines to shut down for
months, years, or perhaps indefinitely, causing thousands of United
States workers to lose their jobs.163 Even where other sources may be
available, factors of cost and quality could have a serious impact upon
the competitiveness of American companies.'" At the very least,
United States manufacturers should be granted a transition period of
twenty-four months from the date of enactment in order to obtain al-
ternative sources of technology.165
B. BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS
One proposal designed to improve the effectiveness of the export con-
trol system is for the United States to seek compensation for the diver-
sion of militarily critical technologies to the Soviet bloc from the gov-
ernment of the individual or firm that took part in the illegal
diversion.1 6 Because both Japan and Norway failed to enforce Cocom
regulations,16 7 the United States should seek compensation from these
countries. The United States may insist that both Norway and Japan
share in the costs of improving the underwater detection systems of the
United States or restore in some manner the capability the United
States lost as a result of the illegal diversion.168 Instead of holding the
government of the companies accountable for the added defense cost,
the United States could calculate the incremental cost of accelerating
their programs to compensate for the Soviet advances in advanced mill-
countries to negotiate toward the common defense).
163. See U.S. Corporations Lobby Against Toshiba Curb, supra note 135, at Al
(arguing that although a ban against Toshiba imports is designed to punish Toshiba, it
will in fact do great economic harm to leading American companies for whom Toshiba
is a principle supplier); Rasky, U.S. Seen Easing Stance on Toshiba, N.Y. Times, July
20, 1987, at DI (explaining that American companies have pressured Congress not to
ban Toshiba products because sanctions would prove detrimental to those companies).
164. U.S. Corporations Lobby Against Toshiba Curb, supra note 135, at D12.
165. Procurement and National Security Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 2731
Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987) (statement of Rep.
John G. Rowland).
166. See 133 CONG. REC. 58997 (daily ed. June 30, 1987) (partial extract of
amendment proposed to the Export-Administration Act of 1979 and the Export-Ad-
ministration Amendment Act of 1985 proposed by Senator Garn) (suggesting greater
cooperation between the United States President and Cocom member states to protect
United States national security).
167. Peterson, supra note 71, at 1 (elaborating on the debate that violators of
Cocom regulations should face tougher penalties).
168. TRADE BILL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 161, at H2093 (providing that
in the case of mandatory sanctions, the Secretary of Defense must determine the costs
of restoring United States military preparedness).
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ing machine technology. 169
In addition, the President could initiate bilateral negotiations with
the government of Norway and Japan to secure compensation from
their governments in the form of money, expanded defense programs,
or participation in joint anti-submarine warfare programs. 1 0 To maxi-
mize leverage for such compensation, the United States could suspend
sanctions against the foreign companies involved until an attempt at
bilateral negotiations is made.17 1 Such attempts to resolve disputes over
Cocom violations bilaterally may also lead to greater mutual trust and
understanding between Cocom members and thus produce a more ef-
fective system of export controls.
C. MULTILATERAL RESPONSE TO THE INCIDENT
One alleged systemic problem that reduces Cocom's effectiveness is
the inadequate harmonization of national efforts to control illicit tech-
nology transfers. 73 In the wake of the Toshiba-Kongsberg incident, it
is vital that Cocom members take multilateral action to improve har-
monization and enhance licensing controls and enforcement. 74 For in-
stance, license evaluations must include both a detailed technical analy-
sis of the equipment proposed for export and end-user checks. 7 Cocom
must continually update the list of embargoed goods to remove goods
that become widely available for sale in the West and to add newly
169. 133 CONG. REC. S8998 (daily ed. June 30, 1987). The Garn Amendment
allows the President to initiate discussions with the firm or individual and its national
government regarding compensation in an amount proportionate to the cost of research
and development of new defensive systems. Id.
170. See 133 CONG. REC. S8995 (daily ed. June 30, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Garn) (maintaining that the United States provides the Japanese 'with most of its na-
tional defense needs, while Japan devotes less than 1% of its gross national product to
defense); accord Toshiba Bashing, supra note 116, at 18 (stating that the Japanese
Constitution renounces the right to use military force). As a result, Japan spends only
1% of its gross national product on "self-defense." Id. Similarly, Norway does not al-
low any foreign troops or nuclear weapons on its soil during peacetime. Id. Norway
also does not allow allied military exercises any closer than 500 miles from its Arctic
border with the Soviet Union. Id.
171. TRADE BILL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 161, at H2093 (mandating
that in any case which sanctions are applied, the President must consult with the viola-
tor's government to seek remedial action).
172. 134 CONG. REC. S8998 (daily ed. June 30, 1987) (statement of Sen. Garn).
173. See Kiernan, supra note 60, at 304 (stating that Cocom success in preventing
the transfer of technology is seriously undermined by its informal structure).
174. Technology Diversion Hearings, supra note 95, at 14 (statement of Dr. Paul
Freedenberg, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administration).
175. See 15 C.F.R. § 385 (1982) (stating that list changes may take into account
technological advances and the availability of particular goods to controlled nations




The Cocom members must coordinate their laws for punishing of-
fenders of Cocom rules. Cocom members must impose stiff fines for
companies that violate the rules and long jail sentences for employees
who falsify documents. In Japan and Norway, extension of the statute
of limitations for this type of crime would help to deter violations. 7
For instance, the Norwegian police allowed the statute of limitations on
the diversion to expire, and, as a result, some Kongsberg employees
potentially implicated in the machine tool shipments were not prose-
cuted. " 8 The threat of criminal prosecution can act as a powerful de-
terrent to unscrupulous business practices. The number of violative
technology transfers would diminish if all Cocom countries agree to
treat willful export control violations as serious criminal offenses.
The United States has proposed that Cocom establish a separate
multilateral military committee to oversee establishment of the list of
sensitive military goods.17 9 Representatives from each member coun-
try's Defense Ministry would be included in this military committee.180
These military experts would assist in developing criteria for identify-
ing strategic technology transfers.18" To date, only France and the
United States have export licensing controls that include formal provi-
sions for military advice and review.1 82 Establishment of these commit-
tees would provide a military analysis essential for greater reliability
and enforcement of the Cocom regulations.
In addition to the formulation of a military committee, Cocom must
tighten its requirements for the shipment of strategic goods. For in-
stance, Cocom should adopt a standard destination control statement
for all shipping documents accompanying strategic commodities.8"
176. Come On, Cocom, THE ECONOMIST, July 7, 1987, at 18.
177. Lachica, U.S. Asks Allies To Curb Exports To Soviet Union, Wall St. J.,
June 22, 1987, at 22. Norway intends to lengthen the statute of limitations on export
violations to ten years from the current two. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id. (stating that the Reagan administration prefers to improve the security
of Western technology through allied cooperation rather than through trade sanctions
imposed by Congress).
180. See Sternheimer, supra note 42, at 17 (stating that in Japan MITI predomi-
nantly controls export licensing). Currently, there are no interagency boards or com-
mittees in Japan to oversee export licensing. Id. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Ministry of Finance play very minor roles in this area. Id. The security and strate-
gic considerations are minimized; therefore, the Japanese Defense Agency also has an
insignificant role in export controls. Id.
181. See id. (stating that because MITI is responsible for export licensing, security
and strategic considerations, the Japanese Defense Agency is given minimal attention).
182. Cocom Limitations, supra note 10, at 128.
183. Statement of Dr. Paul Freedenberg, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
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This would enable customs inspectors to more readily identify commod-
ities that are controlled to certain specified destinations and track the
movement of these goods."" Increased accountability of sensitive tech-
nology will reduce the possibility of evasion of Cocom controls.185
Cocom nations must create greater multilateral cooperation with
non-Cocom countries such as Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland to re-
strict the flow of sensitive technology through these channels. 186 These
countries provide important avenues for diversion of Cocom list items
and are major Soviet alternative and direct sources for some items on
the Cocom list.'87 "Multilateral cooperation" should imply the future
denial of strategic technology from the United States and other West-
ern countries to any nation that allows strategic technology to be
passed on to Communist nations.
The United States must emphasize the need for its allies to expand
their current export licensing agencies to include more staff officials.' 88
The Japanese export control staff currently consists of thirty customs
officials and the Norwegian staff consists of six, while the United States
maintains an export control staff of 620 officials. 8" The Cocom allies
need to improve their institutions responsible for restricting the flow of
militarily sensitive technology to the Soviet Union. 90 It is imperative
that they staff their export control ministries with personnel trained to
distinguish between exports that are permitted under the Cocom regu-
lations and those that are not. 9 ' Moreover, on-site inspections of high-




186. Western Security, supra note 14, at 24.
187. See id. (stating that diversion of controlled goods through neutral European
countries which are not now members of Cocom, and are not ever likely to join Cocom,
creates obvious tensions).
188. Come On, Cocom, THE ECONOMIST, July 11, 1987, at 18. See Japan to
Double Cocom Enforcement Staff, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (July 8, 1987) 877 (stat-
ing that MITI proposes to double the number of inspectors regulating exports).
189. Keeping Our Technology, supra note 22, at 1. Japan has thirty people oversee-
ing 200,000 licenses annually; twenty of these were added only after the Toshiba case
became public. Id. Norway has only six officials in its office of export licensing. Id. In
comparison, the United States has more than quadrupled the number of personnel in-
volved in export control over the past decade. Id.; Technology Diversion Hearings,
supra note 95, at 45 (statement of Dr. Paul Freedenberg, Assistant Secretary of Com-
merce for Trade Administration). The United States government utilizes 620 licensing,
inspection and enforcement officials and spends about $37 million per year on its export
control system. Id.
190. Technology Diversion Hearings, supra note 95, at 14 (statement of Dr. Paul
Freedenberg, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administration).
191. Lachica, Japanese Move to Appease U.S. in Toshiba Case, Wall. St. J., July
17, 1987 at 16 (noting that the United States and Japan will exchange teams of visit-
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tech manufacturers are necessary.
Multilateral export controls need to focus more on critical technolo-
gies that transfer vital design and manufacturing know-how instead of
simply regulating end-products.1 9 2 In practical terms this means that
controls must be implemented at the source of production rather than
at national borders. 93 The United States must cooperate with its allies
to detect the methods the Soviet Union uses to steal Western technol-
ogy.194 Once these channels are identified, the export control personnel
of every Cocom country should be alerted to potential diversions.
Moreover, both industry and government should communicate more ef-
fectively with each other in an attempt to accurately track the chang-
ing nature of strategic technology.
CONCLUSION
The avarice of a Japanese and a Norwegian company and their re-
spective governments' lack of adequate supervision of sensitive military
exports has seriously undermined Western security. Toshiba and Kong-
sberg covertly violated the established standards that govern the opera-
tion of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control.
These companies diverted advanced milling machinery that has enabled
the Soviet Union to develop much quieter submarine propellers.
Cocom's main weakness lies in its lack of enforcement mechanisms.
The seriousness of this diversion reinforces the notion that the United
States cannot pursue export controls unilaterally. This incident illus-
trates that a commitment by all of Cocom is necessary to make multi-
lateral controls uniformly effective. The proposed imposition of unilat-
eral United States sanctions against these companies, however, is not
the most productive way to achieve greater enforcement. The Toshiba
diversion illustrates that all members of Cocom should commit them-
selves to make multilateral controls uniformly effective. Other Cocom
member states must strengthen their export control systems and im-
prove enforcement in their own countries. The United States must work
with its allies on a joint control regime that is credible and workable to
prevent future diversions of this nature. The Toshiba-Kongsberg inci-
dent serves as a lesson that much work remains before the West can
maintain control over the sensitive technology upon which its very sur-
vival depends.
ing experts to help raise the quality of Japanese export control personnel).
192. See Bucy Report, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that the transfer of design and
manufacturing know-how is of overwhelming importance to our national security).
193. Id. at 3.
194. Technology Diversion Hearings, supra note 95, at 15 (statement of Dr. Paul
Freedenberg, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administration).
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